The Design Argument Pt. 2: Hume's Objections

To read part one discussing the design argument in detail, please click here.

David Hume (1711-1776) is acknowledged to give some of the best criticisms of the design argument. In his book, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779), he creates three fictional philosophers who discuss the nature of God. These philosophers are Philo, Cleanthes and Demea, who all have different views and characteristics to aid his objection.

Cleanthes begins by starting a teleological argument similar to that of Paley’s watch analogy. They state that the world bears similar aspects to that of machines; all parts fit together and work towards a purpose. Note how comparable this is to that of Paley’s work, although there is thirty years between them. Cleanthes concludes the argument by claiming that just as a machine is built by a human designer, the world must have been built by a divine one, explaining cause and effect in the natural world. Just as Paley did, Cleanthes is observing the effect (the watch/ the world), and then moving backwards to identify the cause (human designer/ God).

Philo’s objections to Cleanthes’ analogy can also be applied to that of Paley’s. The beliefs of Philo within this dialogue are similar to Hume himself, therefore, they are assumed to be one in the same. They both abide by critical scepticism, and are empiricists*. This is the starting point of Philo’s first objection - we have no experience of world making. We know that machines have designers for we have direct experience and knowledge of their manufacturer. Through our observation, we know they have come into being by careful design. But if we didn’t know of an engineer, or a manufacturer, we would not know this, and hence would not assume that a watch, for example, has been designed. Hence, in order to know of what has brought something into existence, we need to have experience of it’s being brought into existence in the first place. We have no experience of Universes being brought into existence, so Hume claims we cannot know whether or not it has been created.

William Paley responded to a similar criticism on his watch design analogy: “we may be in ignorance of how watches are made”. Paley seems to assume that although we have never seen a watch come into creation, we somehow know that they have been manufactured without any understanding of precisely how this is done. Paley asks, “does one man in a million know how oval frames are turned?”, the answer is no, but the answer to whether we know for certain if the frames have been designed, is yes. This is because these objects have certain intrinsic features which show us that they have been invented and built for a purpose by human hands.

Hume’s point extends beyond this objection, however. We can successfully infer that objects which are unfamiliar to us have been designed by comparing them to those we have already encountered. Here lies a very important problem. If we have absolutely no experience of the manufacturing process, direct or indirect, an object would appear mysterious and “alien” to us. We cannot, however, compare the creation of the Universe to anything else. Exactly how it came into being is unique and cannot be experienced. We can only experience parts of our Universe, not the Universe as a whole. Imagine observing the strap of a watch and the clock face, these parts on their own tell us little about the function and origin of the watch, we need all the other parts and for them to be combined to truly understand it’s purpose.

“From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn anything concerning the generation of man?” - Philo/ Hume

In conclusion to this criticism, Hume does not believe we have any grounds for concluding that God created the Universe. We have no experience of the Universe being designed and no other Universe to compare it to. This raises a huge criticism for those who swear by the design theory to support their beliefs using analogy.

Also, arguments from analogy are often weak. This is Hume’s second objection. Because X resembles Y in a clear, observed respect, this does not necessarily mean that they are alike in another, hidden respect. These arguments are only reliable when there is a staggering amount of similarities, and these similarities have to be relevant. Smaller analogies are far less daring. We live in a world consisting of materials which are primarily created from the same elements, and living things made of flesh, muscle and bone. It is within human nature to deduce how an object will behave by observing what it is made from and other factors that we gather from our senses. For example, from my own analogy, I notice that whenever we stub our toes, you and I behave in exactly the same manner; we recoil and grit our teeth in response. From this, I can fully conclude that when you stub your toe, you are feeling pain. Even though I can’t feel your pain, I can feel my own pain and know this is comparable to yours. This is because we share one factor which makes my analogy completely justifiable - we are both human. Therefore, does a machine and the Universe have enough relevant similarities to support that they were both designed, let alone that one important factor?

Hume/ Philo doesn’t think so. He feels that the Universe is not comparable to a machine at all, rather it is more organic than mechanic, similar to a living thing than ‘a watch or knitting loom’. The purpose of different parts of the Universe seem to be the growth of vegetation, not one of ‘reason or design’. Since a vegetable does not have any visual designer, and instead is born from a natural process, we have no reason to assume the entire earth is a product of design. Suggesting that our planet is a giant vegetable may seem ludicrous, but this is exactly Hume’s point. He feels it is nonetheless bizarre than comparing it to a watch. To Hume, both the watch analogy and vegetable analogy are flawed in the same respect. This is because, as we’ve said previously, for an argument from analogy to be reliable the two things being compared need to be alike in relevant ways. Cleanthes therefore cannot conclude the world has a designer by comparing it to a man-made object.

The third problem stems from Cleathes’s assumption that ‘like effects have like causes’, meaning that if two things are similar in their effects, then they must have similar causes. If Cleanthes, and Paley, are to conclude that the Universe has a designer, they must assume that:

• Machines and the Universe have similar features of design (‘like effects’)

• Therefore they have both been designed by an intelligent being (‘like causes’)

Philo takes the notion of ‘like causes’ and expands on some illogical points of how comparing the Universe with machines is a little absurd. By staying true to the analogy, he actually manages to extract entirely different conclusions. He makes the following points:

• Complex machines are not the result of one designer, but of many. For a particular invention and it’s construction, it can take an entire team of people’s intelligence. So, abiding by the ‘like causes’ principle, the analogy points towards multiple deities creating the Universe, instead of a single God.

• Anthropomorphising the world’s creator by comparing God to a human designer is flawed. The designers of complex machines usually have weaknesses, they learn from mistakes and can be foolish and forward-thinking. By comparing them to God, we are insinuating that God is also morally weak. Does this mean God bears more similarities to human designers too? Can they reproduce? Do they have genders like the Gods of Ancient Greece? Philo is deducting an entirely different designer to Cleanthes and Paley; instead of one powerful, genderless God, he has concluded there must be many gendered and morally flawed designers.

• Complex machines are usually the result of years of trial and error which are forever being improved by every new generation. By the ‘like causes’ principle, the many worlds may have been “botched and bungled” before the creation of our one. Therefore, the analogy suggests that there may be many imperfect Universes before this one, once more pointing to a flawed designer.

• The design faults within a machine usually suggest the designer lacked skill or simply didn’t care and was neglectful of their creation. This is another problem caused by comparing God to a human manufacturer. The Universe appears to contain many design faults, such as pain and suffering. This implies, staying true to the teleological analogy, that God is also careless and lacking of skill; not the traditional view of an omnipotent God we are so accustomed with. Cleanthes and Paley’s all-loving God here is lost, and as Philo concludes, the most reasonable explanation for the designer of the Universe is “entirely indifferent… and has no more regard to good above ill than to heat above cold or drought above moisture”.

This leads onto the final objection, the problem of evil. I will probably explore this larger area in a later post, but in short, it stems from the point above. Why would God create a world which is full of evil? This objection is not fatal for the teleological argument. Paley explored this criticism whilst defending his watch theory, claiming that an object does not have to be perfect in order to be designed, the only importance is that it exhibits some form of purpose. The existence of God is not incompatible with the presence of design flaws such as unnecessary suffering.

It’s possible to avoid Philo’s criticisms here. The teleological argument does not describe what type of God created the world, only it simply concludes that such a God exists. Those who support the theory, therefore, can simply say that we know little about this God. As long as the object in question exhibits evidence of design and appears to have a purpose, Cleanthes, Paley and others can justifiably claim that it has a designer. Robert Hambourger, a modern support of teleology, states that as long as the Universe displays elements of design, even if some parts appear to be flawed, then this “would be enough to show that something was seriously wrong with the atheist’s standard picture of the Universe”. If an atheist admitted to possible design, then they are subconsciously admitting to a designer, thus greatly undermining the position of their beliefs.

However, since the debates of Hume and Paley, we have come a long way with distinguishing the many different types of beliefs within our society. For those who already strongly believe in the presence of God, it is easy for them to gaze across a beautiful landscape and see evidence of God’s handiwork in aspects of nature. However, for those who do not believe, the result is entirely different. Hume’s character of Philo concludes that all the design argument is able to establish is that “the cause or causes of the Universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence”. Just how far this human intelligence extends however, lies at the very heart of the untimely debate over God’s existence.

*An empiricist is someone who supports the theory that all knowledge is derived from our sensory experience, e.g. touch, sight and sound.