Altruism and Egoism: Justifying Plato & Aristotle - Part Two

In the first part (click here) of this two-part post, we explored the centre of Plato and Aristotle’s ethics - the ‘good life’. We looked in depth at Aristotle’s ideals and how he believed we should function as human beings to be rewarded with ultimate happiness. Both philosophers, although their works differ, agree on one thing - we must act morally and justly according to our reason. Plato’s tripartite soul tells us that reason must rule over spirit and desire, and Aristotle’s good life is obtained through moral reasoning. However, to behave in such a controlled manner dictates that we do not act out of self-interest, but by what is right.

If the ultimate goal is our own happiness, then surely abiding by restrictive reason to obtain this is acting selfishly?

Naturally, this opposition has been proposed against these ancient theories.

Firstly, let’s define the word altruism. The dictionary gives the following meaning, “selfless concern for the well-being of others”. The problem here is immediate and raises an issue with Plato and Aristotle’s morally good person. Altruism, in my personal opinion, has always seemed an inhuman quality. I have based many decisions on the feelings of others, but although my choices may appear selfless, I have enhanced my reputation and felt ‘good’ as a result. Am I therefore acting morally, or am I merely acting to benefit myself?

In Richard Norman’s work, he discusses the criticism given by H.A. Prichard in his 1928 lecture ‘Duty and Self Interest’. He was an English philosopher born in 1871 who studied knowledge and perception; his published works concern Kant’s theories of knowledge. Some philosophers believe that Plato and Aristotle’s moral life is misconceived, including Prichard. Prichard argues that if justice is advantageous to the just person, then it is an advocate for self-interest, not justice. A just person should be someone who keeps a promise because it is a promise, pays their debt because they owe, does not lie as they are not dishonest. This is entirely different to a person who does these things purely because it’ll make them happier or better off.

Plato and Aristotle promote justice and virtue to achieve happiness, so although the actions they teach are correct, they are in pursuit of a personal gain. Thus, altruism, viewed in context as a supreme value, only applies if the action’s result is a selfless concern for others. If I am acting selflessly because it will make me happier, then the concern is really for myself, and is therefore not celebrated as true morality.

This should not be interpreted as a dismissal of altruism altogether. Justice is an altruistic virtue among others that requires respect for others, honesty, loyalty and so forth. The criticism is that Plato and Aristotle justify altruism in accordance to one’s personal happiness, which degrades the term to a sort of cultivated self-interest and deprives its moral value. Aristotle held a great regard for friendship and thought a concern for others to be an important element for achieving the good life.

However, can we flip Prichard’s criticism and use it to defend Plato and Aristotle instead. We cannot deny that living harmoniously in a cooperative society will benefit the just person also, and this does not mean they are necessarily behaving out of self-interest, but their own happiness is a consequence of their moral behaviour. Surely then, this is a good enough reason for living this type of life. A life governed by communal respect is far better than that of hostility and disregard for one another.

Criticism or defense, it is difficult to reach a mutual ground. In in his book, Norman attempts to resolve the issue by looking at Glaucon and Adeimantus’s view in The Republic. They suggest that justice is widely considered as a mutual insurance policy. Living justly is not advantageous in itself, but has advantageous consequences for the just person (goodness from others). Glaucon and Adeimantus are not satisfied and ask Socrates to demonstrate that justice is good in its very nature, not simply as a consequence. Norman divides the two oppositions as Glaucon’s view (although it does not belong to him) and the Socratic view (shared by Plato and Aristotle).

According to Glaucon, justice is a good to those who act justly as others will act justly towards you, thus they will be better off. According to the Socratic view, justice does not have advantageous benefits alone, it is the greatest benefit it itself. The following diagram below illustrates the differences:

In ‘Glaucon’s View’, justice is an instrumental good, enabling what we need in order to live well. The Socratic view is intrinsic (innate); justice is living well. Glaucon’s relation between justice and benefit is external, whereas the Socratic is internal.

Another difference is that Glaucon’s view is structured on an already preconceived idea of happiness regarding the moral person’s interests, and Glaucon’s argument is based on this assumption. However, in the Socratic view, no such idea of happiness previously exists and the argument itself seeks to redefine the meaning. If we follow the Socratic view, then the idea of happiness changes in reflection to our new understanding of justice.

For Glaucon’s argument, we must know what our interests are and discover how justice contributes to them. But for Aristotle and Plato it is the opposite, we must understand justice first, and then we will learn what our true interests are.

Plato explores the Glauconian virtue in the eighth book of The Republic. We return here to the tripartite soul concept with different parts ruling over each other. In the account of the oligarchic personality (a small group exercising government control), the person who acts justly to benefit an external self-interest, is corrupt. He is not ruled by reason, but by desire. Plato refers to the selfish reasoning that withholds evil impulses as a “constraint” formed by fear of the implications as a whole.

“There’s no moral conviction, no taming of desires by reason, but only the compulsion of fear… This sort of man, then, is never at peace with himself, but has a kind of dual personality, in which the better desires on the whole master the worse. He therefore has a certain degree of respectability, but comes nowhere near the real goodness of an integrated and united character”

Just like Plato, Aristotle analyses virtue in terms of the right relation between reason and feeling, shown in part one discussing the Doctrine of the Mean. If the moral person obtains this relation, they are living the fully human life of reason.

Norman feels like Prichard’s criticism loses its impact when discussing these two opposing views. It is an instrumental attitude which cannot be described as altruistic; if someone treats others with respect as a means to his own happiness, then Prichard’s argument seems persuasive. However, the intrinsic view presented by Plato and Aristotle shows a concern for others as being constitutive of one’s personal happiness, and thus makes the agent appear no different to the altruistic person.

The Problem of Egoism

Norman, however, further criticizes Plato and Aristotle by offering a third response to a given predicament. Suppose a neighbour, he says, is in need of help, and we question why we should help him. The Glauconian response would be that by helping him, he may one day help you in return, and your reputation will improve, thus earning the respect of others - the instrumental attitude. The Platonic and Aristotelian response would state that we should help him because a life of sympathy for others is the most fulfilling kind. However, Norman contrasts both views with a third response - we help him because he needs help. This third answer appears most genuine when compared to the other two, revealing there is still a problem with Plato and Aristotle’s answer.

Some of Aristotle’s words concerning particular virtues strengthen these doubts. Of the generous person, he says:

“He will avoid giving to any and everybody, so that he may have something to give to the right people at the right time and in circumstances in which it is a fine thing to do”

Surely, this does not display a motivation fuelled by giving the right people the help they need, but a motivation to ensure that the agent has the best opportunity to exhibit liberality. Norman points out a similar notion in Aristotle’s account of the ‘great-souled’ or ‘magnanimous’ person.

“The magnanimous person does not take petty risks, nor does he court danger, because there are few things that he values highly; but he takes great risks, and when he faces danger he is unsparing of his life, because to him there are some circumstances in which it is not worth living. He is disposed to confer benefits, but is ashamed to accept them, because the one is the act of a superior, and the other the act of an inferior. When he repays a service he does so with interest, because in this way the original benefactor will become his debtor and beneficiary”

The agent here appears to reserve his courage not for when it is needed, but for when he can exhibit most courage, and believes competition in virtues such as giving and receiving to be valid. Aristotle’s moral person does not cultivate the virtues for his own interests, but for their own sake. However, they are cultivated for the self, for what the person wants to be, i.e. courageous, instead of responding to the other person’s needs in their own right. This exhibits, claims Norman, a subtle form of ‘moral egoism’.

Moral egoism =

morally performing an action if, and only if, performing that action maximises my self-interest.

Norman highlights Aristotle’s emphasis on ‘ends’. This commits Aristotle to saying that if virtuous activity does not result in a further consequence - an end, then it must be an end itself. The circumstances are detached from the virtuous activity, becoming an opportunity to achieve the end of performing the virtuous activity, instead of the activity being a response to the circumstances. Norman asks if Plato and Aristotle can avoid this whilst retaining the link between virtue and individual happiness. Our own happiness, he says, is surely an end. If virtuous activity is constitutive of happiness, and if this is a reason for exhibiting it, do we not have to say that the virtuous activity is also an end in itself? Norman suggests this places Aristotle’s view under ‘moral egoism’.

There is a way to avoid this whilst retaining both the idea of personal happiness and the idea of other people’s needs a reason for altruistic activity. Norman distinguishes between two different levels of reasoning, as an example he uses the following two questions:

• “What action should I perform here and now?”

• “What kind of life should I lead?”

He gives a detailed example to illustrate the second question. Suppose we have hit a standstill in our lives and feel as a result we have become too self-interested. Thus, we decide to become more concerned for those around us, the reason being that our own life would be further enriched. The change may involve thinking about other’s needs precisely, rather than how helping them can better our own life. Therefore, on some occasions, we might end up helping others just because they need help.

Norman leaves his example here, stating that he has shown that Plato and Aristotle have not obviously degraded their moral views to a blatant self-interest. He suggests that there is a more problematic case of egoism in their works, but whether or not this is a grounds for criticism must wait until we have explored a clearer of view of altruism and egoism, covering the two areas:

1. The Social Dimension

Altruism is dependent on social relations in the moral person’s life. Norman asserts that a satisfactory account of the ethical significance of altruism depends on the treatment of this role, and he suggests that Plato and Aristotle do not provide anything substantial concerning this dependence. In fact, in The Republic, Plato entwines moral and social philosophy as one to an unusual extent.

We are now returning to Plato’s tripartite soul. Plato’s account of justice in the individual parallels justice in society, covering his beliefs in how the state should be governed (click here for further reading). The soul consists of three factors; reason, spirit and desire, and reason should be in control of the others to obtain justice. Plato stated that this reflects justice within society, it also consists of parts which should function harmoniously.

The problem here as this is not a relation between justice in society and justice in the individual, but an analogy. The account does not explore the individual in a social context, but simply argues that because justice in society is harmony between different parts of the state, by analogy justice in the soul must be harmony between different parts of the personality. We do not know, however, is how the individual’s justice is analogous to society’s structure, nor how society is affected by the individual. Plato does say something about the justice of the individual’s impact on the social structure, but the answer is unusual.

“... It is better for every creature to be under the control of divine wisdom. That wisdom and control should, if possible, come from within; failing that it must be imposed from without, in order that, being subject to the same guidance, we may all be brothers and equals”

Thus, ordinary people with a weaker rational part of the soul can only achieve justice in a well-ordered society. They would make up the economic, or auxiliary class. This means that, if justice is achieved by reason, but one’s own reason is not developed enough, then the ruler’s reason must excel instead. For this certain individual, justice is only possible in a just society.

We are now exposing Plato’s own doubts on his theory of the soul and ideal state. Those who have a powerful reason are recognised as wise, as thus the perfect rulers. Only they can govern a just society. They can, however, achieve justice in themselves without becoming a ruler. Glaucon asks if this ruler is unlikely to enter politics (end of Book Nine). Socrates responds that he will, not in the society where he is born, however, but “in the society where he really belongs”. That society is the just, ideal, harmonious society envisioned by Plato, and Glaucon states “I doubt if it will ever exist on earth”. Plato agrees, and says,

“Perhaps, it is laid up as a pattern in heaven, where those who wish can see it and found it in their own hearts. But it doesn’t matter whether it exists or ever will exist; it’s the only state in whose politics he can take part”

This expresses Plato’s hesitation. The just society is not wholly practical, and he loses confidence that it is possible for the good man to be just in its absence. However, even if such a society existed, it would add nothing to the good man, for he would take the role of guardian with reluctance and for the society’s benefit, conflicting with a politician who readily accepts the role to further his power. This is further amplified when Plato expresses that after obtaining true knowledge, the philosophers should once again return to the cave where this knowledge is not obtainable, “... but [we] shall be quite justified in compelling them to have some care and responsibility for others”.

Therefore, Plato implies that the truly just individual doesn’t need society to live a just life, he can do so in any society, or none at all.

This is similar to Aristotle. Aristotle’s contemplative life, introduced in Ethics, also appeals to the Platonic ideal of the self-sufficient philosopher exercising true knowledge and consequently, the good life.

“...but the wise man can practise contemplation by himself, and the wiser he is, the more he can do it. No doubt he does it better with the help of fellow-workers; but for all that he is the most self-sufficient of men”

Therefore, Norman concludes that neither Plato or Aristotle have given a significant account of social relations in the good life. He feels that we cannot divulge further into the ethical significance of altruism until we have clarified the nature of our relations with others.

2. The Christian Tradition

The second area Norman discusses for a clearer understanding of the problem with altruism and egoism is how ethical philosophies have been influenced by Christian traditions. Christianity places altruism at its core, and this morality is the foundation for the entire religion.

“Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself” - Matthew, 22:39

Both Christianity and Plato share a ‘two-worlds’ metaphysics - the world of the flesh, and the world of the spirit. Just like Plato, Christianity preaches turning away from pleasure and material goods (the virtue of self-denial) for the higher life of communion, or for Plato, the world of forms.

However, Christianity contrasts with Aristotle. Christians praise humility and humbleness, whereas Aristotle’s ‘great-souled’ person, who withholds their courage so they can exhibit it later on a greater scale. Aristotle seems to promote self-esteem and respect, acknowledging one’s own merits and praising as necessary. Aristotle considered ‘truthfulness’ a virtue, and thought we should be open and honest, opposite to the Christian-taught self-denial.

But which ethical view is more appealing? As always with the subject, there is no established right or wrong. Norman states that the two views need to be criticized and defended, which is beyond the topic of this subject. He personally does not see the value of self-denial, which is crucial to altruism in its own definition. Things in the material world can only be devalued as ‘worthless’ he states, if there is a spiritual world in comparison, and that our objective is to transcend closer to this world to enable our soul to be nearer God. Norman concludes that he cannot accept the metaphysics, and subsequently the morality which goes with it.