Altruism and Egoism: Justifying Plato & Aristotle - Part One

The Aim

This two-part post aims to cover criticisms responding to Aristotle and Plato’s concept of the good life, achieved by understanding human nature and applying moral knowledge in the pursuit of the goal of life - happiness.

In the first part, we will explore Aristotle’s Ethics. We have lightly touched on this before, which you can read here. However, I shall study his work at a closer angle, aided by the works of Richard Norman. I have been reading his book The Moral Philosophers: An Introduction to Ethics and decided to summarise what I’ve learnt from him.

Aristotle’s Good Life

In a three-part post previously, I discussed in detail Plato’s Allegory of the Cave (for part one, please click here). We divulged into Plato’s ideal of the ‘perfect state’, which structures a good and virtuous world with Philosophy being the “chief pursuit” at its centre, resulting in divine knowledge and ultimately, happiness.

We have lightly touched on Aristotle’s Ethics, which you can read here. Although taught by Plato, he doesn’t always agree with him. Aristotle rejected Plato’s theory of the forms on ethical grounds, stating that knowledge which is unchanging cannot guide changing ethical actions. He takes a different approach to the good life, theorising in the virtue of character. Aristotle believed that the human being’s unique facility to rationalise is a commonality with the Divine, and that we should seek higher knowledge by contemplating the universe whilst admiring it. Living well and doing well are the two benefactors of the good life, and living according to our exclusive reason instead of emotions are the key to happiness - eudaimonia.

It must be noted that the term eudaimonia is an objective form of happiness, unlike happiness in itself which is a psychological state - feeling happy can be considered as short term, whereas being happy is a desired outcome of well-being. There is also the issue of ‘pleasure’, but if we describe Aristotle’s definition of happiness as ‘flourishing’ then this evades the problem. The Epicureans, however, believed the two to be relatable. Aristotle accepted, as did Plato, that happiness and pleasure are connected, as we can feel pleasure but not be happy. When we are engaged in a positive activity, the pleasure is good, but in a negative activity the pleasure is bad. Therefore, pleasure can be viewed as a scale of how unethical a person is. This cannot be used to measure genuine and ethical happiness.

“We always choose [happiness] for itself, and never for any other reason. It is different with honour, pleasure, intelligence and good qualities generally. We do choose them partly for themselves; but we choose them also for the sake of our happiness, in the belief that they will be instrumental in promoting it”

Like Plato, Aristotle aims to show that living in accordance to traditional values that this happiness is attainable. His thesis is centred around one important general consensus - the ultimate end of human action is happiness.

“Every art and every investigation, and similarly every action and pursuit, is considered to aim at some good”

However, we must not become tangled in the misunderstanding that Aristotle believes the only ‘end’ is good, and human desires are not just a ‘means’ towards happiness. In 1.7 of the Ethics, Aristotle states that we only choose happiness for itself, and for no other reason. The virtues, however, are chosen for two reasons:

• For themselves - virtues are to be chosen regardless of consequences

• For happiness - They partake in the ultimate goal

Thus, the virtues are desirable for themselves and there are many things which are good respectively. They are not aimed as ends alone, but for attainable supreme happiness also, whereas happiness is only aimed for itself. Thus, this is what makes happiness a final end and superior to others.

Function and Reason

In order to prove that happiness is achieved by following reason, Aristotle proposes the notion of human function. We have touched on the subject before here, but I shall summarise now briefly.

“... Just as we can see that eye and hand and foot and every one of our members has some function, should we not assume that in like manner a human being has a function over and above these particular functions?”

To learn what our function is as human beings, we must find what is distinctive and exclusive to our race. Empirical matters are shared with animals, and life itself with plants also. But, our ability to exercise reason is distinctive to us, and is therefore our function.

However, if we look at Aristotle’s analogies, is a human’s function the same as their social role? Is a carpenter’s function… carpentry? Surely we cannot define a person solely by their expertise or the social role which they fill. The human body analogy above is also flawed. Bodily organs are all parts of a single organism, but there is no such organism that human beings are a part of. Thus, the analogy can be viewed as invalid.

Philosophers who defend Aristotle state that ‘function’ is not the correct translation of the Greek word ‘ergon’, which means task. Therefore, Aristotle is not stating that human beings have a function, but an activity which is unique to their character. However, this defence still does not support the premise. If we change function to ‘characteristic ability’, Aristotle is further exposed to criticism. A characteristic ability is not exclusive to one particular individual, and just because an activity can be seen as distinctively human, this is not a reason to engage in it. Norman gives a comedic example - just because humans are capable of destroying the planet with nuclear weapons, this does not mean that they should!

Doctrine of The Mean

This popular thesis shows us how acting according to reason is the distinguishing feature of all traditional virtues. We have explored why Aristotle considers living this way is the key to supreme happiness, but haven’t delved into how we can achieve this.

The doctrine works by analysing the virtues on a scale of feeling, and how reason should rule over two opposing extremes. The extremes are:

• Excess - Feeling an emotion too little

• Deficiency - Feeling an emotion too much

Many interpret Aristotle’s doctrine as a matter of moderation, but some philosophers state this isn’t true regarding his own words. Those who observe the mean are never too ecstatic or morose, neither do they respond to objects or principles with favouritism, even those of a political view. However, Aristotle distinguishes two different means - the mean in relation to the thing, and the mean in relation to us. The popular conception refers to the first; a midpoint of feeling, whereas the latter depends on circumstance. This can be clearly explained by Aristotle’s quote,

“It is possible, for example, to feel fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity, and pleasure and pain generally, too much or too little; and both of these are wrong. But to have these feelings at the right times on the right grounds towards the right people for the right motive and in the right way is to feel them to an intermediate, that is to the best, degree; and this is the mark of virtue”

Therefore, the doctrine is not revolving around a ‘midpoint’ of feeling. The correct feeling relies entirely on the given situation which will be changing (remember before that Aristotle does not agree with Plato’s theory of forms as unchanging knowledge cannot model ethical knowledge). For example, if someone mishears my question and I respond with a bout of anger, this is not reasonable, but if I witness a loved one being severely hurt, then, my reaction can be seen as rational. My feelings cannot be scaled by excess and deficiency alone, the situation will determine the extent of how my feelings should be exhibited.

However, this principle breeds further questions and seems rather unsubstantial. There is no predetermined guide as to what the correct feelings are to every given situation that we may experience. It may seem reasonable to me as an individual to feel frustration when somebody mishears me for the fifth time. We need to feel the right feeling at the right time at the right extent towards the right people. There’s an awful lot of room for error.

This principle can either be viewed as considerable, or not considerable at all. The popular interpretation is clearer to practice and understand.

Norman interprets Aristotle’s doctrine in the following way. He accepts Aristotle’s notion as a connection between feelings and reason. Aristotle states that the mean is to apply both feelings and actions. Actions, he decides, are an expression of feeling. The difference between right and wrong is a matter of degree. Therefore, our judgement over right and wrong is not qualitative, meaning it should not be subjective, but quantitative, and although an action can express a feeling to the right degree, it is presently excessive or deficient. Both extremes are wrong, but feelings in themselves are not, if felt to the correct extent.

This shows us a contrast between Aristotlean and Platonic philosophy. Plato thought our spirit and desires, including feelings, should be governed by reason, such as ‘taming the beast’. There is a clear opposition between feeling and reason. Aristotle, however, believed that feelings are the embodiment of reason; reason can be present in them. To exercise this reason correctly, we must approach a situation with the right degree of feeling exclusive to that situation. If we are affected by a feeling caused by something prior, e.g an argument before leaving home, then we are not judging our feelings in accordance to reason.

But the problem still persists, how do we know where the mean lies? Perhaps Aristotle gives an ambiguous answer because there is no certainty, but he does state that we should act as a ‘prudent man’ would (prudent translated from the Greek word phronimos, a possessor of practical wisdom).

“... So virtue is a purposive disposition, lying in a mean that is relative to us and determined by a rational principle, and by that which a prudent man would use to determine it”

Practical wisdom is known as phronesis, and is possessed by the phronimos. The key feature of this type of knowledge is that it does not concern universals (generalization), but particulars (subjective). Thus, this knowledge does not apply to a set of rules, but is simply knowing what the right thing is to do in a particular situation. The phronomis’s actions are the standards to follow.

The knowledge we need to understand the mean is not obtained by theoretical principles but by moral training. We learn throughout our lives when we have behaved incorrectly, and through our mistakes we can exercise the correct actions consisting of reason, and ultimately, virtue.

In summary, we have detailed Aristotle’s ideal of the good life, and have explored how we can achieve this using our human function - reason, (if we choose this angle of interpreting Aristotle instead of a social role). Judging our actions in accordance to our reason will lead us to happiness, the ultimate goal.

In part two, we shall explore criticisms against both Plato and Aristotle, covering the issues of altruism versus egoism.